ASIA unversity:Item 310904400/18110
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  全文筆數/總筆數 : 90437/105768 (86%)
造訪人次 : 10976166      線上人數 : 474
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
搜尋範圍 查詢小技巧:
  • 您可在西文檢索詞彙前後加上"雙引號",以獲取較精準的檢索結果
  • 若欲以作者姓名搜尋,建議至進階搜尋限定作者欄位,可獲得較完整資料
  • 進階搜尋
    ASIA unversity > 管理學院 > 國際企業學系 > 期刊論文 >  Item 310904400/18110


    題名: Dynamic Pricing in Regulated Insurance Markets with Heterogeneous Insurers: Strategies Nice versus Nasty for Customers
    作者: 利菊秀;Chu-Shiu Li;Chih Hao Lin;Chwen-Chi Liu;Arch G. Woodside
    貢獻者: 國際企業學系
    關鍵詞: Pricing strategy;Automobile insurance;Claim coefficient;Multi-period contract;Nice;Nasty;Customers
    日期: 2012
    上傳時間: 2012-11-26 12:09:31 (UTC+8)
    摘要: This study examines a phenomenon in one nation's automobile insurance market where insurers adopt diverse pricing strategies in this regulated industry that does not allow for such diversions—a homogeneous, insurance industry in which a government authority sets the official pricing formula as well as all of the rating factors. Insurers use a claim coefficient that reflects previous claim records of policyholder as an implicit pricing tool to over/under charge new and repeat customers. The aim here is not so much to blow-the-whistle on pricing practices that violate regulations but to describe execution details of the practices and their outcomes. The results show that firm-level, systematic, price variances that occur differ from prices that follow from applying regulated individual-claim coefficients. Based on the unique firm-level pricing strategies, this study finds that some insurers are more nice to new customers and nasty to repeat customers to increase market shares while other insurers earn high profits by being nasty to repeat customers. The assumption that a behavioral primacy effect may exist in the market may guide some firms' pricing strategies.
    關聯: JOURNAL OF BUSINESS RESEARCH,65(7),968–976.
    顯示於類別:[國際企業學系] 期刊論文


    檔案 描述 大小格式瀏覽次數


    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - 回饋