English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Items with full text/Total items : 90452/105769 (86%)
Visitors : 11989593      Online Users : 840
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    ASIA unversity > 資訊學院 > 資訊工程學系 > 期刊論文 >  Item 310904400/25355

    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://asiair.asia.edu.tw/ir/handle/310904400/25355

    Title: Provably Secure Three Party Encrypted Key Exchange Scheme with Explicit Authentication
    Authors: Tsai, Hao-Chuan;Chang, Chin-Chen
    Contributors: 資訊工程學系
    Keywords: 3PEKE;Password;Off-line guessing attack;Provably secure
    Date: 2013-07
    Issue Date: 2013-07-11 14:18:42 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: In 2007, Lu and Cao proposed a simple, three-party, password-based, authenticated key exchange (S-3PEKE) protocol based on the chosen-basis computational Diffie–Hellman assumption. Although the authors claimed that their protocol was superior to similar protocols from the aspects of security and efficiency, Chung and Ku pointed out later that S-3PEKE is vulnerable to an impersonation-of-initiator attack, an impersonation-of-responder attack, and a man-in-the-middle attack. Therefore, Chung and Ku also proposed a countermeasure with a formal proof to remedy the security flaws. Unfortunately, we have determined that Chung and Ku’s protocol cannot withstand an off-line password guessing attack. In this paper, we briefly review Chung and Ku’s protocol, demonstrate its weakness, and propose an enhanced version that is provably secure in the three-party setting.
    Relation: INFORMATION SCIENCES,238(20):242-249.
    Appears in Collections:[資訊工程學系] 期刊論文

    Files in This Item:

    File SizeFormat

    All items in ASIAIR are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback