ASIA unversity:Item 310904400/25355
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    ASIA unversity > 資訊學院 > 資訊工程學系 > 期刊論文 >  Item 310904400/25355


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    题名: Provably Secure Three Party Encrypted Key Exchange Scheme with Explicit Authentication
    作者: Tsai, Hao-Chuan;Chang, Chin-Chen
    贡献者: 資訊工程學系
    关键词: 3PEKE;Password;Off-line guessing attack;Provably secure
    日期: 2013-07
    上传时间: 2013-07-11 14:18:42 (UTC+8)
    摘要: In 2007, Lu and Cao proposed a simple, three-party, password-based, authenticated key exchange (S-3PEKE) protocol based on the chosen-basis computational Diffie–Hellman assumption. Although the authors claimed that their protocol was superior to similar protocols from the aspects of security and efficiency, Chung and Ku pointed out later that S-3PEKE is vulnerable to an impersonation-of-initiator attack, an impersonation-of-responder attack, and a man-in-the-middle attack. Therefore, Chung and Ku also proposed a countermeasure with a formal proof to remedy the security flaws. Unfortunately, we have determined that Chung and Ku’s protocol cannot withstand an off-line password guessing attack. In this paper, we briefly review Chung and Ku’s protocol, demonstrate its weakness, and propose an enhanced version that is provably secure in the three-party setting.
    關聯: INFORMATION SCIENCES,238(20):242-249.
    显示于类别:[資訊工程學系] 期刊論文

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