ASIA unversity:Item 310904400/63613
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    ASIA unversity > 管理學院 > 財務金融學系 > 會議論文 >  Item 310904400/63613


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    题名: How do the insured’s behavior change on risk and risk aversion affect asymmetric information?
    作者: 蔡英哲 (Tsai, Ying Che),鄭安峰 (Cheng,An-Feng)
    贡献者: 銘傳大學財金系 , 國立政治大學風險管理與保險學系
    关键词: Asymmetric Information, Risk Averse, Car Insurance, Malus-Bonus Scheme
    日期: 2010
    上传时间: 2013-08-07 09:18:41 (UTC+8)
    出版者: 銘傳大學財金系 國立政治大學風險管理與保險學系
    摘要: Little works had well discussed how insured’s behavior change on risk or risk
    aversion influences the asymmetric information problem. Empirically, using the data
    set of car damage insurance, this article shows that the change of insured’s risk
    aversion (risk) significantly constitute the positive (negative) effects of behavior
    change, which deteriorates (alleviates) asymmetric information when car insurance
    market indeed suffer such situation. Alternative, this paper demonstrates that the
    magnitude of positive or negative effects of behavior change is influenced by three
    factors: the price elasticity of risk aversion, the price elasticity of risk, the elasticity of
    demanding for insurance, by which the problem of alleviating (deteriorating)
    asymmetric information can be subtly explained. Also, in practical, these three factors
    could efficiently correct the malfunction on Malus-Bonus Scheme.
    關聯: 2010中部學術財金研討會 論文發表
    显示于类别:[財務金融學系] 會議論文

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