English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Items with full text/Total items : 90074/105197 (86%)
Visitors : 7165904      Online Users : 42
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    ASIA unversity > 管理學院 > 財務金融學系 > 會議論文 >  Item 310904400/63632


    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://asiair.asia.edu.tw/ir/handle/310904400/63632


    Title: How collective bargaining with labor union may affect firms’ share repurchase decision?
    Authors: Sheng-Syan Chen, Yanzhi Wang,Yan-Shing Chen
    Contributors: Department of Finance College of Management National Taiwan University, Taiwan,Department of Finance Yuan Ze University, Taiwan,Department of Finance National Yunlin University of Science and Technology, Taiwan
    Keywords: 庫藏股, 工會, ?資談判,Share repurchase, labor union, collective bargaining
    Date: 2010
    Issue Date: 2013-08-07 09:20:38 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: Department of Finance College of Management National Taiwan University, Taiwan,Department of Finance
    Yuan Ze University, Taiwan,Department of Finance
    National Yunlin University of Science and Technology, Taiwan
    Abstract: 本文研究工會??對於公司股票購回政策的影響。一方面,當公司宣告購回
    庫藏股時,工會可能將此訊息解?為公司有多餘的現?或是公司未?的獲??況
    比預期要?的好,在?資談判中會以較強硬的姿態要求提高待遇及福?。因此,
    購回庫藏股將??公司在?資談判中的的談判?。換言之,在工會勢?強大時,
    公司將儘?避免購回庫藏股。但另一方面,購回庫藏股可以減少公司的現?與增
    加負債比?。過去研究顯示?低公司的?動性有?於公司在?資談判中逼迫公會
    退讓。因此,本文以1983 至 2007 ?美國宣告實施庫藏股的公司為樣本?驗證
    工會的??對於公司庫藏股決策的影響。
    本文發現在工會?與?高的產業的公司宣告庫藏股的機?較低,宣告購回的
    股?比?與實際購回的比?也較低。這種工會???低公司實施庫藏股的意願的
    情況在低B/M, 低現?與高負債比?的公司?為顯著。此外,我們發現工會??
    強的公司宣告庫藏股後的長期?常報酬低於配對公司。最後,宣告庫藏股的公司
    在次?發生罷工的機?較未宣告的公司增加4.44%。以上結果支持實施庫藏股有
    害於公司對工會的談判?,進而?低公司實施庫藏股意願的假?。
    This paper use a U.S. sample from 1983 to 2007 to study how labor union can
    affect firm’s share repurchase activities. On the one hand, share repurchases signal
    firm’s prosperous future profitability, which can be used by union as an excuse to
    raise wage demand. Therefore, firms facing strong union should avoid repurchase. On
    the other hand, share repurchase reduces firm’s cash and raise leverage, which
    enhance firm’s bargaining power against union. Accordingly, highly unionized firm
    should repurchase shares more frequently. Empirically, we find firms in highly
    unionized industry are less likely to announce share repurchase. Moreover, repurchase
    program in highly unionized industry are associated with lower intended and actual
    buyback ratio. The negative relationship between share repurchase and union strength
    is more pronounced in low B/M, low cash and high leverage firms. In addition, we
    find repurchase firms in highly unionized industry have lower market valuation in the
    long-run. Finally, we show that repurchase announcement increases the strike
    probability of announcing firm by 4.44% in the next year. Together, our findings
    2
    suggest that share repurchase weaken firm’s bargaining power against union so that
    firms facing strong union strategically avoid repurchase.
    Relation: 2010中部學術財金研討會 論文發表
    Appears in Collections:[財務金融學系] 會議論文

    Files in This Item:

    There are no files associated with this item.



    All items in ASIAIR are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback