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    ASIA unversity > 管理學院 > 財務金融學系 > 會議論文 >  Item 310904400/63682


    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://asiair.asia.edu.tw/ir/handle/310904400/63682


    Title: In?ation Bias, Real Exchange Rate, and Optimal Monetary Policy in An Open Economy
    Authors: Lin, Yo-Long
    Contributors: National Chi Nan University
    Keywords: Real exchange rate channel, in?ation bias, time consis- tent policy, coordination, and non-coordination.
    Date: 2010
    Issue Date: 2013-08-07 09:25:45 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: National Chi Nan University
    Abstract: It is well-known that there are unique challenges to design optimal
    monetary policy in an open economy since an e?ort by one country's
    expansionary policy to in?ate may depreciate its currency, which in-
    duces greater domestic in?ation through the real exchange rate chan-
    nel. Due to the existence of the above tempering e?ect of the real
    exchange rate channel, monetary authorities under non-coordination
    realize that lowering unemployment is more costly. With coordinated
    policy, however, policymakers are more likely to in?ate since the in-
    ?uence of tempering is removed. To investigate the impact of an ex-
    ogenous change in the natural rate of unemployment on the optimal
    time consistent monetary policy regarding in?ation bias, we present
    a two-country framework to compare the minimal-state-variable ra-
    tional expectations equilibria under three di?erent scenarios: coor-
    dination, non-coordination, and leader-follower regimes. The theory
    demonstrates that, under either coordination or non-coordination, a
    rise in one country's natural rate of unemployment will lead its own
    in?ation to increase if the e?ect of unanticipated in?ation surprises is
    stronger than the e?ect of the real exchange rate channel. Moreover,
    we suggest that the international interactions of the natural rate of
    unemployment and the MSV REE in?ation depends on the design of
    the exchange rate regime. Furthermore, the potential gains to coun-
    tries coordinating exchange rate policy depend on the relative degrees
    of in?ation bias between the two economies.
    Relation: 2010中部學術財金研討會 論文發表
    Appears in Collections:[財務金融學系] 會議論文

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