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    ASIA unversity > 管理學院 > 財務金融學系 > 會議論文 >  Item 310904400/63713

    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://asiair.asia.edu.tw/ir/handle/310904400/63713

    Title: Dose the Purchasing of Directors’ Liability Insurance Enhance or Mitigate a Firm’s Overinvestment
    Authors: Chen, Chia-Wei;Lin, Pin-Shiuan
    Contributors: Department of Finance Tunghai University
    Keywords: Directors’ liability insurance, Overinvestment
    Date: 2012
    Issue Date: 2013-08-07 09:29:23 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: Department of Finance Tunghai University
    Abstract: Since financial crisis has become a critical issue, no matter government or firms and even investors should be pay more attention on managerial behavior. Therefore directors and officers should be liable for the corporation misconducts. Directors’ and officers’ liability is designed to protect directors and shareholder wealth. With publicly available and relatively complete dataset of listed firms in Taiwan in which the information of directors’ liability insurance is disclosed since 2008, in this paper, we attempt to revisit the role of directors’ liability insurance through a topic that has not been explored. In particular, we suspect the firms’ investment decision-making process could be differential in firms with and without the adoption of this insurance. As previous literature documented that this insurance could be beneficial and enhance the function of the board, recent event studies in contrary reveal the cost of this insurance and suggest the purchase of this insurance are likely to accelerate the severity of agency problem. Since both arguments above tend to change managerial behavior and therefore investment decision, capturing the degree of overinvestment under firms with and without directors’ liability insurance accordingly is an opportunity to realize the pros or cons of this insurance. While almost equal amount of firms with and without this insurance in Taiwan allows us to fairly compare the difference generated by the insurance, results from this project could provide new evidence to explain the behavior of investment and help to evaluate the policy of mandatorily disclose the information of directors’ liability insurance as well.
    Relation: 2012中部學術財金研討會 論文發表
    Appears in Collections:[財務金融學系] 會議論文

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