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    ASIA unversity > 管理學院 > 財務金融學系 > 會議論文 >  Item 310904400/63733


    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://asiair.asia.edu.tw/ir/handle/310904400/63733


    Title: CEO’s Compensation with Effort and Project Choice
    Authors: Xue, Xiaolin
    Date: 2013-01-09
    Issue Date: 2013-08-07 09:31:29 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: This paper considers the agency problem between a shareholder
    and his CEO when the CEO privately chooses not only the effort level
    but also the project to invest. First, I identify the optimal contract and
    the analysis focuses on how the presence of an unobservable project
    choice can crucially change the compensation schemes. Second, the
    tradeoff between the two managerial actions is examined. I provide
    the conditions under which a more risky or a less risky project than the
    shareholder desires is selected. Third, I study how the unobservability
    of the project choice decreases the shareholder’s expected profit and
    how it distorts the managerial decisions further than the unobservable
    effort does. At last, I look into the consequences for the shareholder
    of ignoring the unobservable project choice in designing the executive
    compensation scheme.
    Relation: 2013中部學術財金研討會 論文發表
    Appears in Collections:[財務金融學系] 會議論文

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