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    ASIA unversity > 管理學院 > 財務金融學系 > 期刊論文 >  Item 310904400/9889

    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://asiair.asia.edu.tw/ir/handle/310904400/9889

    Title: 公司組織結構資訊內涵與新上市(櫃)期初報酬
    Authors: 王元章;楊淑玲;陳獻儀
    Contributors: 財務金融學系
    Keywords: 公司治理;組織結構;集團企業;期初報酬;Corporate Governance;Organizational Structure;Business Groups;Initial Returns
    Date: 2008
    Issue Date: 2010-06-08 13:53:17 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: Asia University
    Abstract: 本研究欲驗證的是組織結構不同的初次上市(櫃)公司,其所隱含的資訊不對稱與代理問題
    以降低集團企業的代理問題。 In this article, we first examine whether there’s any difference in the content of asymmetrical
    information and agency problem conveyed in different organizational structure of IPO firms. Second,
    we investigate the relation between the information content connoted in organization structure of IPO
    firms and their initial returns in Taiwan. Using data on 355 IPO firms, we find that there is no apparent
    information content about information asymmetry in organizat ional structure of IPO firms. As for
    agency problem, IPO firms with diverse organizational structure show distinct degrees of information
    contents. Compared with IPO firms, either independent or as a member of parental group, the firms
    with capital from both mother and brother companies disclose stronger information contents due to
    their serious agency problems. Besides, multivariate regression results suggest that their information
    contents about agency problem affect IPOs initial returns more through signal theory than by
    information asymmetric theory. Finally, the evidence suggests that independent outsider director is
    effective in reducing the agency cost of group firms.
    Relation: 證券市場發展 20(3):141-189
    Appears in Collections:[財務金融學系] 期刊論文

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